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August 14, 2000 
 
Jim Sylph 
International Federation of Accountants 
535 Fifth Avenue - 26th Floor 
New York, NY 10017 
 
Comment Letter on June 2000 Exposure Draft, "Independence - 
Proposed Changes to the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants" 
 
Dear Mr. Sylph: 
 
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on your June 2000 
Exposure Draft (the “ED”).  Please understand that these 
comments represent solely the views of the staff rather than those 
of the Independence Standards Board, which has not considered 
the issues and develops its positions only after extensive due 
process and deliberation. 
 
Our overall impression is that the draft is very well done, and we 
congratulate the IFAC Ethics Committee for a high quality 
product. 
 
We will respond first to your broad questions (a) and (b), and 
then comment on other matters in the ED, generally in the order 
in which they appear. 
 
1. Your Question (a) - Whether the change from a prescriptive 
approach to an approach that sets out a framework of risks 
and safeguards is acceptable -  
 
We agree with this proposed change, and are developing a 
similar approach.  As you know, we are well along in our 
project to develop a conceptual framework for auditor 
independence, and are currently evaluating comments on our 
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2. Your Question (b) - Whether the risks identified in this exposure draft are 
considered serious and whether the safeguards identified are adequate - 
 
Overall, we believe IFAC has done a good job of describing the independence 
threats, but the discussion of safeguards should be expanded.  Some 
suggestions are included in our detailed comments that follow. 
 
3. Restriction of auditors with respect to certain other client-related entities -  
 
We believe it would be helpful for you to define additional related entities, 
beyond the "assurance client," from which independence would be required.  
While such relationships occasionally are mentioned in your detail (e.g., the 
mention of parents and subsidiaries in 8.106), a more comprehensive 




4. Requiring in your definition of "independence" the "ability to demonstrate" 
the appropriate limitation of risks to the "appearance" of independence -  
 
We agree with the general thrust of your definition of independence, including 
the reference to independence in appearance.  We question, however, the 
language requiring an auditor to be able to demonstrate that an “informed 
third party would not reasonably question” an auditor’s independence.  An 
“ability to demonstrate” may become an issue in litigation and enforcement 
actions.  Would the auditor have to conduct an opinion survey “to be able to 
demonstrate” how an “informed third party” would view something?  Our 
own research, and responses we have obtained from seemingly informed third 
parties to our discussion memoranda and exposure drafts, have indicated that 
reasonable, informed people can reach different conclusions on the same set 
of facts.   
 
We would suggest instead that the auditor be required, when there is no 
specific guidance on point, to consider how, in the auditor’s view, an 
informed third party would view a situation.  This language we believe makes 
the standard operational for an auditor and reduces the risk of inappropriate 
after-the-fact second-guessing.  You use language consistent with our view in 
8.5 (“so that [reporting accountants] can decide”) but in 8.3 you say “ the 
significance of economic and financial interests should always be measured in 
light of what an informed party may consider reasonable or acceptable” 
[emphasis added].  We also believe this language needs attention since we do 
not know how a reporting accountant can “measure” what someone else 
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We strongly agree with the last sentence of 8.6 – that knowledge, or 
reasonable expectation of knowledge, of a relationship by the auditor is 
necessary to compromise independence.  This has been an issue for many 
years, and we are using similar language in our standards.   
 
5. Definition of the "reporting accountant" -  
 
We believe that "the firm" itself should be included in the definition of the 
"reporting accountant."  Also, additional guidance likely is needed with 
respect to some of the alternative practice structures now appearing in the 
United States, as described in our recent Discussion Memorandum No. 99-2, 
"Evolving Forms of Firm Structure and Organization." 
 
In addition, we suggest that the phrase "in a position to influence the audit" 
include those partners and managerial employees who provide only non-audit 
services to the client. The ISB has done this because, at least under U.S. 
generally accepted auditing standards, the auditor is required to discuss 
matters that may affect the audit with firm personnel responsible for non-audit 
services to the entity, and the Board did not want an independence issue to 
impact the candor of those discussions.  
 
Further, we are not sure what is intended by the phrase “directly influence.”  
We believe the ability to influence should be the criterion without trying to 
determine if it is directly or indirectly.  Similarly, in 8.1, the term “direct 
management responsibility” could be read to exclude the chain of command, 
which we believe would be a mistake. 
 
6. Objective of the guidance –  
 
In 8.7, your draft states that “The objective of this guidance is to assist 
reporting accountants in evaluating …” We believe that the intended audience 
should be substantially broader.  That is, it should assist not only reporting 
accountants, but also regulators, audit committee members, client 
management, and other stakeholders in auditor independence. 
 
Also, 8.7(a) states that “any risks to independence are clearly insignificant.”  
Rather, in some cases the threats themselves could be significant, but the 
application of safeguards sufficiently mitigates those threats to reduce the 
remaining independence risk to an insignificant level. 
 
7. The “self-interest risk” –  
 
8.12(b) prohibits a loan to an “owner” of an assurance client.  We suggest that 
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percent?).  Otherwise loans, including publicly issued debt, held by the auditor 
in a nominal shareholder of an audit client, could be deemed an impairment.   
 
8. The “self-review risk” 
 
In 8.13(b) we again question the use of the term “directly.” 
 
9. Safeguards –  
 
8.18 describes a number of possible safeguards, in several categories.  We 
would add these: a) establish a “tone from the top” supportive of auditor 
independence, both within the firm of the reporting accountant and within the 
client’s corporate goverance structure; b) consult within the firm; and c) foster 
communication between the auditor and the audit committee as described in 
our ISB Standard No. 1. 
 
In addition, the introduction states:  “Safeguards should be recognized and 
acknowledged as preserving the reporting accountant’s independence.”  
“Preserving” implies acceptability; would a word like “promoting” be better 
(i.e., helping, but not necessarily achieving)? 
 
10. Financial involvement with the client and family relationships –  
 
As to guidance in 8.102 on other close relatives, we believe “materiality” for 
investments of other close relatives should be measured both with respect to 
the relative and to the partner or firm employee.  This is intended to address 
cases where an “other close relative” has an investment in a client which is 
material to the family member, but which is immaterial to the firm 
professional.  For example, an adult child of the audit partner could have an 
investment in the audit client that is very material to the child, but is 
immaterial to the partner.  We believe that even if the partner were aware of 
the investment, it would not affect his or her behavior.  On the other hand, we 
agree that an investment that is immaterial to the other close relative does not 
represent a threat to the independence of the auditor, even if the amount would 
be material to the auditor. 
 
The second to last bullet in 8.103 suggests “removing the individual 
professional who has received the financial interest from all direct 
participation in the engagement.”  We believe the person should also not be 
“in any other position of influence over the engagement.” 
 
8.119 seems to have a narrow definition of “officer.”  We believe it should 
include all officers of an entity who have policy-making authority.  We also 
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should have a close relative (not just an immediate family member) in one of 
those positions, or in other positions described in 8.119.  We do not believe 
that any safeguard short of prohibition would be effective, or be seen to be 
effective. 
 
Further, 8.120 – 122 describe employment restrictions for relatives, but we 
believe the restrictions should be strengthened.  Specifically, for immediate 
family members of those on the audit, we believe all client employment 
presents a self-interest threat to independence.  This is because such 
employment is considered too likely to create financial or emotional ties to the 
client which are not appropriate for the auditor.   
 
11. Business relationships with a client –  
 
We agree with the 8.104 description of  client business relationships, but 
believe this guidance should be broadened.  For example, many other types of 
business relationships exist that are of concern, such as a strategic alliance.  
Also, we believe the “significance” exemption of 8.104 should be limited to 
category (b).  Similarly, we object to the exemption proposed in 8.105:  other 
than in identified “grandfathered” or deposit account situations, the auditor 
should not borrow from client banks because of the possibility of client 
influence through the loan. 
 
12. Serving as an officer or on the board of an assurance client -  
 
8.106 proscribes the reporting accountant from serving as an officer or 
director of the client.  It does not seem to prohibit other partners (or other 
employees) from being a client officer or director, but we believe it should. 
 
13. Providing other services to the client –  
 
A. Bookkeeping – 8.111 indicates that the auditor can help discharge the 
client’s bookkeeping responsibility as long as he or she doesn’t make 
management decisions.  We believe such services are problematic even 
absent making management decisions because they introduce possible 
self-review and self-interest risks.   However, we believe it is not 
necessary to deem independence impaired if the bookkeeping service 
includes activities that are immaterial (in the aggregate) to the financial 
statements being reported on. 
 
B. Valuations – 8.113 similarly implies that management acceptance of full 
responsibility for an auditor’s valuation, plus safeguards, may overcome 
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(including self-review and self-interest) are fundamental, and that 
prohibition is appropriate. 
 
C. Acting for the client in the resolution of a dispute or litigation - We 
suggest that the language of 8.114 “accountants assist their assurance 
clients” be used rather than the “act for a client” wording (used in the title 
and 8.115-.116), which implies assuming a management and decision-
making role. 
 
14. Former partners –  
 
Please see our recently issued ISB Standard No. 3, “Employment with Audit 
Clients.”  In particular, please note that our cash-out provisions extend in 
some cases to more than those individuals included in your definition of the 
“reporting accountant.” 
 
15. Long association of senior personnel with assurance clients –  
 
The second sentence of 8.127 states that:  “This risk is actually more 
perceived than real.”  We urge the deletion of this statement – we believe the 
threat of over-familiarity with the client described in 8.15 could be real in 
these circumstances. 
 
16. Fees – relative size –  
 
Since the reporting accountant is defined to include the partner in charge of 
the audit, it may not be possible, or desirable, to meet the conditions of 
8.128/9.  That is, the most effective audit may require the partner to devote his 
full time efforts to that assignment.  In those situations, the firm will need to 
develop safeguards to avoid or mitigate any concerns about dependence of the 
audit partner on the client. 
 
17. Fee – Other services 
 
8.131 states that “Independence may be compromised when fees are earned 
from an assurance client for non-audit services,” but this doesn’t clearly 
communicate what the threat to independence is. 
 
18. Actual or threatened litigation –  
 
8.138 states that the primary question regarding litigation is whether the 
auditor can “continue to assume management’s good faith.”  We believe the 
key concern in such cases is the continued complete candor in auditor-client 
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commence, legal action against the auditor, the auditor and the client 
management may be placed in adversarial positions in which the 
management’s willingness to make complete disclosures and the auditor’s 




Again, we compliment you on the quality of the exposure draft and in particular 
the framework you have adopted. 
 
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at any time. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Arthur Siegel 
 
